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INTRODUCTION
From 2006 through 2011, apprehensions of unauthorized
immigrants by border patrol agents plummeted.1 While
apprehension rates still remain at a historically low level,
authorities have documented an uptick since 2012.2 Two
categories of unauthorized immigrants have significantly
contributed to the rising apprehension rates: those subject to
expedited removal who claim to fear persecution and
unaccompanied alien children (“UACs”).
Expedited removal is a process created in 1996 that permits
immigration authorities to summarily deport certain individuals
apprehended at or near the border.3 The major exception to
summary deportation is for those who demonstrate a credible
fear of persecution or torture.4 Thus, “[t]he ‘credible fear’ process
is in many cases the only mechanism that stands between an
arriving asylum seeker and immediate deportation.”5 For UACs,
immigration law provides certain processes and protections that
curtail authorities’ ability to deport particular UACs quickly.6
Any child without a parent or legal guardian is considered a
UAC.7

1 JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP , OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF
HOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2012,
at 3 fig.1 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enfor
cement_ar_2012_1.pdf. Apprehension rates are different than the number of distinct
individuals apprehended because the same person could be apprehended multiple times
in a given year.
2 U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TOTAL I LLEGAL ALIEN
APPREHENSIONS BY FISCAL YEAR (2014), available at http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
media-resources/stats?title=Border+Patrol (providing apprehension rates in the
southwestern border region from FY 1960 through FY 2013).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2014).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4).
5 Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our Borders?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 143 (2013) [hereinafter Asylum Surge Hearing] (statement of
ACLU et al.).
6 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (requiring enforcement agencies to transfer UACs
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services within seventy-two hours of
apprehension).
7 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines an “unaccompanied alien child” as one
who:
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
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After a gradual rise in claims for several years, the number
of unauthorized immigrants claiming to credibly fear persecution
spiked in the middle of 2012.8 The number of claims nearly
tripled in fiscal year (“FY”) 2013 and the FY 2014 figures depict a
comparably high rate.9 The increase in UAC border crossings
rode the coattails of the surge in credible fear claims.
Immigration authorities started to record a steady rise in UAC
border crossings in 2012.10 By 2014, the staggering surge in UAC
border crossings at the southwestern border began to gain
national attention.11 The situation has been called a “disaster,”12
a potential “national security threat,”13 and a “humanitarian
crisis.”14
Lawmakers have taken notice of the surges as well. The
House Judiciary Committee held a series of hearings to assess
whether migrants are abusing the credible fear process and
ostensibly to identify the causes for the spike in credible fear
claims.15 The UAC surge has also garnered congressional
attention and led to hearings in the House.16

(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and
(C) with respect to whom—
(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or
(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide
care and physical custody.
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012).
8 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.
9 Id. (documenting 36,035 credible fear referrals in FY 2013, up from 13,880
referrals the previous fiscal year); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2014 (2014), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20E
ngagements/Asy-Credible-Reasonable-FearFY14-Q1.pdf
[hereinafter
USCIS
2014
CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS] (documenting more than 20,000 referrals in the first half of
FY 2014).
10 Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PATROL,
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children
(last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
11 Id.; e.g., Frances Robles, Wave of Minors on Their Own Rush to Cross Southwest
Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at A1; Richard Cowan, Waves of Immigrant Minors
Present Crisis for Obama, Congress, REUTERS, May 28, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/us-usa-immigration-children-idUSKBN0E814T
20140528.
12 An Administration Made Disaster: The South Texas Border Surge of
Unaccompanied Alien Minors: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
154 (2014) [hereinafter UAC Surge Hearing].
13 Lindsey Boerma, Is the Surge of Illegal Child Immigrants a National Security
Threat?, CBS NEWS (July 7, 2014, 5:42 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-surgeof-illegal-child-immigrants-a-national-security-threat/.
14 Cowan, supra note 11.
15 See, e.g., Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5.
16 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12.
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Explanations for the causes of these surges vary
considerably. Some point to depressed economic opportunities
and increased crime rates in the so-called Northern Triangle of
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala,17 which are the
countries of origin for most of the migrants.18 Others fault the
enforcement efforts and policy choices of the Obama
Administration.19 Myriad derivations of these potential causes
also permeate the discussion,20 adding to the difficulties in
discerning the most likely causes of these surges. It is important,
however, to identify these causes. The history of immigration is a
collection of derivations on cyclical events and arguments
presented as if they were entirely unprecedented. Whatever one’s
beliefs about the optimal level and types of migration,
immigration law and policy should be grounded in a greater
understanding of the significance of the various push and pull
factors that influence migratory patterns.
This Article looks closer at the available data to try to
identify the factors that have caused this extraordinary surge in
border crossings by credible fear claimants and UACs. Part I
provides an overview of expedited removal and the credible fear
process before reviewing data on credible fear referral rates. Part
II discusses the law that pertains to UACs and provides data to
illustrate the extent of the surge in UAC border crossings. Part
III will review the main factors that could be contributing to the
surges.
In Part IV, this Article will assess holistically the previously
discussed causes and identify how several of them have
converged to create the current crisis. In short, while individual

17 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 94 (statement of Eleanor Acer,
Director, Refugee Protection Program, Human Rights First) (arguing that violence and
other “external factors . . . are the drivers of flight”); Tom K. Wong, Statistical Analysis
Shows that Violence, Not Deferred Action, Is Behind the Surge of Unaccompanied
Children Crossing the Border, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 8, 2014), http://www.am
ericanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2014/07/08/93370/statistical-analysis-shows-t
hat-violence-not-deferred-action-is-behind-the-surge-of-unaccompanied-children-crossingthe-border/.
18 See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 10; Asylum
Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 61 (report of Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research
Service).
19 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte)
(opining that “word has gotten out as to the virtual rubberstamping of applications” by
the administration); id. at 6–7 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz) (blaming the
ineffectiveness of immigration enforcement agencies).
20 See Wong, supra note 17, at 5–6 (using Mexican UAC migratory rates to negate
the significance of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act to the surge in UAC border crossings); Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 2
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (attributing ICE’s “watered down” interpretation of its
parole authority to the surge in credible fear claims).
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circumstances vary, dire country conditions in the Northern
Triangle further deteriorated in certain ways around the time of
the surges. The continued deterioration increased the incentive
to leave. Concurrently, specific U.S. laws, practices, and
immigration policies—along with claims made by nefarious
opportunists—led to some accurate and some misinformed
perceptions that certain migrants have a greater chance to enter
or remain in the United States. When these perceptions spread
amidst deteriorating country conditions, it provided the spark
that motivated a greater number of credible fear claimants and
UACs to make the dangerous journey north.
After reviewing these causes, this Article provides some brief
concluding thoughts. Specifically, this Article suggests limited
reforms that should not be contentious, and reviews how certain
gaps in the available data impugn researchers’ ability to more
fully discern the causes of migration.
I. THE CREDIBLE FEAR PROCESS
A. Expedited Removal
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).21 Prior to IIRIRA,
inadmissible individuals apprehended by the government were
placed into formal exclusion or deportation proceedings in an
immigration court.22 IIRIRA amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) to create a process to significantly
accelerate the removal of many “arriving aliens.”23 Referred to as
“expedited removal,” the procedure permits immigration
inspectors within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) to order that an individual be removed from the United
States without providing that individual with an opportunity to
have his or her case further reviewed by an immigration judge.24
Specifically, IIRIRA authorizes immigration inspection officers to
21 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22 See id.; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A
Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings,
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289 n.2 (2008).
23 An “arriving alien” is
an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United
States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United
States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United
States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether
or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of
transport.
8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 1001.1(q) (2014).
24 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
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summarily order the removal of arriving aliens who are
inadmissible because they do not hold valid travel documents or
because they obtained or attempted to obtain travel documents
by fraud or misrepresentation.25 IIRIRA also provides DHS (as
the successor to the Immigration and Naturalization Service on
such matters)26 with authority to expand the classes of
individuals who are subject to expedited removal.27 Among other
expansions, expedited removal now applies to individuals
apprehended within 100 miles of certain sectors of the northern
and southern borders as long as authorities apprehend such
individuals within fourteen days of their unlawful entry.28
The number of individuals subject to expedited removal is
significant. Between thirty and forty percent of all annual
deportations in recent years have been through expedited
removal.29 Between FYs 2010 and 2012, nearly 400,000 people
were deported through the expedited removal process.30 In 2012,
migrants from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador
comprised ninety-seven percent of all expedited removals.31
B. Fear of Persecution or Torture
If applied without exception, the expedited removal process
would thwart the United States’ obligation to not return to their
home countries individuals with a legitimate fear of being
persecuted or tortured. The United States is a signatory to the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.32 Known as the principle of non-refoulement, the
Protocol prohibits states from repatriating individuals to
countries from which they legitimately fear being persecuted.33

25 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (referring to the grounds of inadmissibility provided
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). “[C]itizens of Cuba arriving at a United States
port-of-entry by aircraft” are not subject to expedited removal. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(i).
26 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1512(d), 1517, 116
Stat. 2135, 2310–11 (indicating that certain references to the Attorney General in
immigration statutes and regulations now pertain to the Secretary of DHS).
27 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (limiting the agency’s expansion authority to aliens
who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and have not been
continuously present in the United States for two years).
28 69 Fed. Reg. 48,876, 48,877–81 (Aug. 11, 2004); 67 Fed. Reg. 68,923, 68,923–26
(Nov. 13, 2002); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
29 SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.6.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 5.
32 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968).
33 Id. art. 33.
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Congress subsequently enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which
codified this obligation.34
The Refugee Act provides that individuals are eligible for
asylum relief if they satisfy the definition of a refugee.35
Applicants can establish they are refugees by demonstrating that
they fear they will be persecuted on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or social group.36 The definition also
requires that asylum applicants demonstrate that the
governments in their home countries are either responsible for
the persecution, or unable or unwilling to curtail the actions of
non-governmental actors.37
Applicants who apply for asylum are also assumed to be
applying for withholding of removal.38 The requirements for
establishing eligibility for withholding of removal under the INA
are largely comparable to the prerequisites for asylum.39 There
are, however, several differences.40 Withholding of removal
implements the government’s non-refoulement obligation by
requiring that the government does not deport eligible applicants
to the countries from which they fear harm.41 While withholding
of removal prohibits repatriation to the persecuting country, it
does not provide the applicant with an opportunity to become a
legal permanent resident.42 Asylum, by contrast, does provide
such adjustment benefits, and for that reason it is discretionary;
the Attorney General does not have to provide applicants with
asylum relief even if they demonstrate eligibility.43
The United States is also a signatory to the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”).44 In 1999, the Attorney General

34 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
35 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
36 Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
37 Id.; see also Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2013).
38 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
39 See id.; id. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16(a)–(b) (2014).
40 For example, applicants are eligible for asylum if they demonstrate a well-founded
fear of persecution, while withholding of removal requires that applicants demonstrate a
clear probability of persecution. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431–32, 450
(1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984).
41 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 544–45 (6th Cir.
2003). Several statutory exceptions can preclude a grant of withholding of removal, but
the ultimate determination is not a matter of discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
42 Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 545.
43 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
44 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at
195 (Dec. 10, 1984).
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promulgated regulations to implement CAT.45 The regulations
prohibit the government from returning applicants to their home
countries if the applicants demonstrate that perpetrators are
more likely than not to torture them.46 Unlike asylum and
withholding of removal under the INA, the regulations
implementing CAT do not require applicants to establish that
they will be tortured on account of race, religion, or any of the
other protected grounds.47
C. The Credible Fear Interview
To ensure compliance with the United States’
non-refoulement obligations, the expedited removal provisions of
the INA and immigration regulations prohibit the government
from summarily deporting a person who demonstrates a credible
fear of persecution or torture. Specifically, the INA provides that
an “immigration officer” should not order an alien removed
“without further hearing or review” when “the alien indicates
either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of
persecution.”48 In many instances, the onus is on the immigration
officer to ask the questions necessary to discern whether the
alien may, in fact, have such a fear. Many have criticized this
aspect of the process, noting that enforcement agents do not
always ask the questions needed to ascertain whether a fear of
harm exists, and, in some instances, agents proactively convince
aliens to agree to removal even after they express a fear of
harm.49
If an individual otherwise subject to expedited removal asks
to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of being persecuted, that
individual is then transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”)—a component of DHS—which detains the
alien until the credible fear interview. The law provides that an
alien must be detained pending the credible fear interview.50 The
interview is conducted by one of the asylum officers in U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)—also a

45 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18 (2014); Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681-821, 2681-822 (directing
the agency to issue regulations to implement CAT).
46 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
47 See id.; see also Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 2007).
48 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (referring to fears of
“persecution or torture”).
49 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON INT ’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 1 REPORT ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: F INDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 50–51 (2005)
[hereinafter 1 USCIRF 2005 REPORT] (observing instances in Houston where agents
pressured migrants to retract their stated fear).
50 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
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component of DHS.51 The officers in USCIS’s Asylum Office must
assess whether the transferred individual has a “credible fear of
persecution.”52 The transferred individual demonstrates the
requisite fear if the asylum officer finds “that there is a
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the
statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and
such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum.”53 The “significant possibility”
language was meant to serve as a compromise standard. The
original House version mandated a “substantial likelihood” that
the alien could establish asylum eligibility, while the original
Senate version merely required the asylum officer to determine
whether the asylum claim was “manifestly unfounded.”54
Changes to USCIS’s credible fear lesson plan in February 2014,
however, have led some to question whether the standard will
become more stringent.55
The time dedicated to these credible fear interviews
demonstrates why it could not possibly be a final
determination—and why the credible fear threshold is
necessarily low.56 Government officials report that, on average,
asylum officers interview claimants for about twenty minutes
before making a credible fear determination.57 The viability of
many asylum claims takes much longer to tease out. Aside from
the substantive information asylum officers must discern, twenty
minutes is hardly enough time to truly assess the credibility of
the claim itself—a task that is incredibly challenging for
adjudicators even when there is a full hearing on the merits.58
Accordingly, as often noted, the credible fear interview is merely

Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B).
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
142 CONG. REC . 25,374 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
Memorandum from John Lafferty, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Asylum Office Dirs., et al. (Feb. 28, 2014),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes from Previous
Engagements/Memorandum-ReleaseofUpdatedADOTCLessonPlan.pdf; see also SARA
CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, MEXICAN AND CENTRAL
AMERICAN ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR CLAIMS: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 4 (2014).
56 But see Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 166 (statement of Leslie E. Vélez,
Senior Protection Officer, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees) (contending that the
credible fear threshold is too harsh).
57 Id. at 189 (statement of Lori Scialabba, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services).
58 See generally Scott Rempell, Credibility Assessments and the REAL ID Act’s
Amendments to Immigration Law, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 185, 196 (2008).
51
52
53
54
55
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a screening device, meant to capture all claims that could
reasonably be viable.59
D. Credible Fear Determinations and Detention
If an asylum officer determines that a claimant does not
have a credible fear of persecution, the claimant is immediately
subject to removal.60 Although the claimant is not entitled to a
full hearing before an immigration judge, he or she can request
that an immigration judge review the asylum officer’s
determination that no credible fear of persecution has been
established; the law requires the immigration judge to review the
denial within seven days.61 Conversely, if the asylum officer
determines that the claimant established a credible fear of
persecution or torture, that individual is placed in formal
removal proceedings before an immigration judge, where he or
she will have an opportunity to apply for asylum, statutory
withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations
implementing CAT.62
The immigration courts lack the resources to timely
adjudicate all the cases on their dockets. There are about 260
immigration judges spread throughout the immigration courts;63
they review nearly 300,000 immigration matters annually.64 As a
result, individuals found to have a credible fear of persecution
may have to wait years before an immigration judge rules on the
merits of their claims.65
The long waiting period makes the issue of detention
particularly consequential. The law is quite clear that DHS must
detain apprehended individuals prior to the credible fear
interview.66 The time lapse between apprehension and the
credible fear interview, however, is typically only a matter of

59 See, e.g., Thomas J. White Ctr. on Law & Gov’t, The Expedited Removal
Study: Report on the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 126–27 (2001); Asylum Surge Hearing, supra
note 5, at 27 (statement of Lori Scialabba, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services).
60 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2012).
61 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g) (2014).
62 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a)(1)(ii).
63 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUSTICE, http://www.just
ice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated May 2014).
64 OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
FY 2013 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at A2 fig.1 (2014); see also id. at W1 fig.34 (noting
350,330 pending cases in immigration courts at the end of FY 2013).
65 Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in
Immigration Courts, TRACIMMIGR ., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_back
log/ (last updated June 2014).
66 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii).
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days or weeks. If an asylum officer—or an immigration judge if
the claimant requests further review—finds that the claimant
has established a credible fear of persecution, immigration law
prescribes certain circumstances that permit ICE to release the
individual from custody pending the formal removal proceedings
in immigration court. The mechanisms for releasing such persons
are based on whether the individual is classified as an “arriving
alien.”
1. Parole for Arriving Aliens
Parole is an administrative measure ICE can use to
authorize the temporary release of certain detained aliens. DHS’s
parole determinations are not subject to review in immigration
court.67 Additionally, in the credible fear context, DHS’s parole
authority is limited to those considered “arriving aliens” because
they were apprehended at a port of entry.68
In certain instances, DHS may parole an arriving alien who
establishes a credible fear of persecution. Immigration
regulations prescribe that parole may be justified for “urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, provided the
aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.”69
Within this framework, the regulations provide five categories of
aliens who may be eligible for parole. These five categories are
aliens with serious medical conditions, women who are pregnant,
select juveniles, witnesses in certain proceedings, and aliens
“whose continued detention is not in the public interest.”70
In 2009, ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton issued a
policy directive to provide guidance to ICE’s “Detention and
Removal Operations (DRO) Field Office personnel for exercising
their discretion to consider the parole for arriving aliens
processed under the expedited removal provisions” of the INA
(“Morton Memo” or “Directive”).71 The Directive sought to clarify
when an alien can be paroled under the fifth category of the
regulation—that is, when an alien’s “continued detention is not

67 See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-01, 48,879
(Aug. 5, 2004) (noting immigration judges’ limited “review of custody determinations”).
68 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 11002.1: PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A
CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE ¶¶ 1–5 (2009) [hereinafter MORTON MEMO].
69 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (internal quotation omitted); see also id. § 235.3(c) (authorizing
parole for aliens placed in removal proceedings after a positive credible fear finding in
accordance with the decisional framework of section 212.5(b)). But see 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (limiting parole eligibility to medical necessity and furthering a
“legitimate law enforcement objective”).
70 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(1)–(5).
71 MORTON MEMO, supra note 68, ¶ 1.
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in the public interest.”72 Regarding this fifth category, the
Directive provides that aliens “should be” paroled if “the alien’s
identity is sufficiently established, the alien poses neither a flight
risk nor a danger to the community, and no additional factors
weigh against release of the alien.”73 By interpreting its parole
authority broadly, the Morton Memo expanded the circumstances
under which parole is available to arriving aliens who establish a
credible fear of persecution or torture.74
2. Release for Aliens Not Apprehended at a Port of Entry
If authorities apprehend an alien in the interior of the
United States but the alien establishes a credible fear of
persecution, DHS is authorized to release the individual during
the pendency of the removal proceeding.75 DHS may, however,
choose to detain the alien or premise release on a bond. Unlike
detention decisions for arriving aliens, DHS’s detention
determinations for aliens who are not considered “arriving” are
subject to review by an immigration judge.76
E. Credible Fear Statistics
Table 1 provides data for credible fear claims adjudicated by
USCIS’s Asylum Office from FY 1997 through FY 2013:

Id. ¶ 4.3.
Id. ¶ 8.3.
Cf. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP ’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE NO . 7-1.0: PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A
CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE ¶ 6 (2007).
75 X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (B.I.A. 2005); see also D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572,
575 −76 (A.G. 2003).
76 See X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 731–36; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2014)
(providing exceptions to immigration judges’ authority to review custody determinations).
72
73
74
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Table 1: Percentage of Claims Where USCIS Finds a
Credible Fear77
Credible
Fear
(“CF”)
Cases

Referrals
from ICE
or CBP

Total
Completed
Cases

Completed
Cases: CF
Found

Completed
Cases: CF
Not Found

Completed
Cases:
Closed

% of All
Referred
Cases
Where CF
Found

FY 97

1438

1206

922

256

28

76.45%

FY 98

3427

3304

2747

125

432

83.14%

FY 99

6690

6463

5762

144

557

89.14%

FY 00

10,315

9971

9285

150

536

93.12%

FY 01

13,140

13,689

12,932

119

638

94.47%

FY 02

10,042

9961

9179

84

698

92.15%

FY 03

6447

6357

5715

45

597

89.90%

FY 04

7917

7754

7282

32

440

93.91%

FY 05

9465

9581

8469

144

968

88.39%

FY 06

5338

5241

3320

584

1337

63.35%

FY 07

5252

5286

3182

1062

1042

60.20%

FY 08

4995

4828

3097

816

915

64.15%

FY 09

5368

5222

3411

1004

807

65.32%

FY 10

8959

8777

6293

1404

1080

71.70%

FY 11

11,217

11,529

9423

1054

1052

81.73%

FY 12

13,880

13,579

10,838

1187

1554

79.81%

FY 13

36,035

36,174

30,393

2587

3194

84.02%

The figures show that between FY 1997 and FY 2012, the
number of individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture
fluctuated from 1438 to 13,880. In FY 2013, by contrast,
claimants spiked significantly; more than 36,000 expressed (or
were found to harbor) a fear of persecution or torture.78 The data
available for FY 2014 indicates a comparably high number.
Through the first six months of FY 2014, DHS referred more
than 20,000 claimants to the Asylum Office for credible fear
interviews.79
77 This Article obtained the data for Table 1 from Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note
5, at 227.
78 This figure does not include individuals who may have claimed to fear persecution
or torture but were not provided an interview by the initial immigration officer. See
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, H OW TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND PREVENT ABUSE AT THE BORDER
11–12, 30–31 (2014) [hereinafter HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES].
79 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9.
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Aside from the number of claims themselves, the figures also
indicate the percentage of credible fear interviews that led
asylum officers to find a credible fear of persecution or torture.
The data can roughly be broken into three distinct time periods.
From FY 1998 through FY 2005, between 83% and 94% of
claimants received favorable credible fear determinations. A
noticeable drop occurred in FY 2006, where the percentage
dipped to the sixties and stayed in that range for several years.
FY 2010 marked the transition into the third time period; since
that time, the Asylum Office determined that claimants had a
credible fear in 79%–84% of cases. The preliminary data for the
first half of FY 2014 indicates an 80% grant rate by the Asylum
Office.80
The percentage of individuals found to have a credible fear of
persecution is even higher when looking solely at those cases
adjudicated on the merits. After claiming a credible fear of
persecution, some individuals withdraw their requests for
asylum before an asylum officer has an opportunity to adjudicate
their claims. In FY 2013, for example, while USCIS found that
84% of individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture did
meet the credible fear standard, asylum officers found the
credible fear standard was met in 92% of cases assessed on the
merits.81 When excluding administratively closed cases in the
first half of FY 2014, the grant rate jumps from 80% to 87%.82
The percentage of individuals subject to expedited removal
who claim to fear persecution or torture has also increased.
According to DHS, from FY 2000 through FY 2009, between 4%
and 6% of individuals subject to expedited removal expressed a
fear of persecution or torture if returned to their home country.83
By FY 2013, that figure rose to 15%.84
II. UNACCOMPANIED MINORS
A. The Law Regarding UACs
Prior to 2003, immigration officials made little distinction
between minors and adults when apprehending and detaining
those who entered the country without authorization.85 While

80 Id. (indicating a credible fear of persecution was established in 16,467 of the
20,488 decisions made).
81 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 20.
82 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9.
83 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 35.
84 Id.
85 See generally 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012) (defining an “unaccompanied alien
child”).
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UACs are still placed into removal proceedings, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 transferred the shelter and placement of
unaccompanied minors to the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(“ORR”), which is a component of DHS.86 Further protections for
unaccompanied minors were created in 2008 when Congress
passed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization
Act
(“TVPRA”).87
Absent
“exceptional
circumstances,” the TVPRA requires agencies holding UACs in
custody to transfer them to ORR within seventy-two hours.88 For
contiguous countries, DHS must determine, within forty-eight
hours, whether the minor is a victim of human trafficking or
otherwise establishes a credible fear of persecution.89 For
non-contiguous countries—such as those of the Northern
Triangle—TVPRA requires several agencies to coordinate best
practices for repatriation.90
TVPRA
also
altered
determinations
regarding
unaccompanied minors’ custody and eligibility for relief from
removal. Regarding custody, TVPRA provides that “an
unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall be promptly placed in the least
restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”91 As a
result, while UACs’ immigration proceedings are pending, federal
agencies typically try to place them with a relative or other
sponsor.92 According to the Migration Policy Institute, “[n]inety
percent of these children are released by ORR into the care of a
parent, relative, or family friend while they await adjudication of
their immigration cases, with foster care the placement for the
remainder.”93 For relief from removal, TVRPA provides
additional opportunities, such as Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status for minors who have been abused, abandoned, or
neglected.94 Like all unauthorized immigrants, unaccompanied
86 Id. § 279(b)(1); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462, 116
Stat. 2135, 2202–03.
87 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044.
88 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (2012).
89 Id. § 1232(a)(4).
90 Id. § 1232(a)(1), (c)(5)–(6).
91 Id. § 1232(c)(2).
92 See id. (noting the law’s preference for “a suitable family member . . . to provide
care”).
93 Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, Dramatic Surge in the Arrival of
Unaccompanied Children Has Deep Roots and No Simple Solutions, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (June 13, 2014), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/dramatic-surge-arrival-unaccom
panied-children-has-deep-roots-and-no-simple-solutions.
94 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d); see id. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (explaining the requirements of Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status); see also id. § 1101(a)(15)(J), (U) (discussing eligibility for
J and U visas that certain UACs may be able to obtain).
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minors who meet the relevant criteria may also be eligible for
asylum.95
B. UAC Statistical Information
The statistics bear out the extent of the surge in UAC border
crossings. Along the southwestern border in FY 2013, border
patrol apprehended 31,491 unaccompanied minors.96 In the first
three quarters of FY 2014, that number spiked to 62,998.97 The
general surge in border crossings is reflective of the UAC
apprehension rate for children migrating from the Northern
Triangle:
Table 2: UAC Apprehension Rate for Northern
Triangle Countries98
Country

FY 2009

FY 2010

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2013 FY 2014
(through
August 31)

El Salvador

1221

1190

1394

3314

5990

14,591

Guatemala

1115

1517

1565

3835

8068

15,733

Honduras

968

1017

974

2997

6747

17,582

Total

9026

9170

8721

10,146

20,805

47,906

The repatriation rate for minors from the Northern Triangle
decreased from 2008 through 2013. Whereas DHS repatriated
2311 minors from the Northern Triangle in 2008, only 469
minors were repatriated in 2013.99
III. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE SURGE
Most of the causes proffered to explain the surge fall into one
of two categories: country conditions in the Northern Triangle
and migrants’ perception that changes to immigration law and
policy favorably impact their chances to remain in the United
States permanently or temporarily. Part IV will review both of
these potential causes before discussing whether the prospect of
immigration reform, border security concerns, and instances of
See generally id. § 1158(a)–(b).
Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 10 (providing
statistics through June 30, 2014).
97 Id.
98 For the source of the data in Table 2, see id.
99 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; see also Robles, supra note 11 (noting the
decrease in removals of children).
95
96
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fraud could impact the migratory calculus. The distinct potential
causes discussed independently in Part III will be assessed
holistically in Part IV.
A. Regional Instability in the Northern Triangle
Looking at the countries of origin of those migrating to the
United States during the surges, one finds at the top El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala. Many politicians, advocacy groups,
and others have proffered that the regional instability in these
countries could be a cause of the increased migration flows in the
past few years. Advocacy groups have argued that “persecution,
violence and war[] are the drivers of flight” and that many
reports “have documented the increased violence in Central
America.”100 Others have argued that the “resulting uptick in
asylum claims” directly stems from “an increase in violence in
Mexico and Central America.”101 Representative Lofgren opined
that the surge could be “a brewing refugee crisis in the Western
Hemisphere.”102 Comparable sentiments have been expressed
about UACs.103
The limited studies that assessed the situation in Central
America have indeed found a dire situation in many Central
American countries—particularly El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala, which comprise the Northern Triangle.104 In 2006,
there were more than 14,000 murders recorded in Central
American countries.105 To put that number in perspective, a
World Bank study noted that Spain—with a population
comparable to all Central American countries combined—only
recorded 336 murders.106 The countries of the Northern Triangle
had some of the highest murder rates. El Salvador led the list in
2006 with 64.4 murders for every 100,000 members of the
population.107
Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 94.
Id. at 156; see also Robles, supra note 11 (recounting the administration’s belief
that it “seems to be quite clear that what is driving this is what’s happening in their home
countries”).
102 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 5.
103 See UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 46 (statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of
the Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops).
104 A Shared Responsibility—Citizen Security and Counter-Narcotics Initiatives in the
Americas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere, Peace Corps & Global
Narcotics Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 57 (2011) (statement
of Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Latin
America Program).
105 WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A DEVELOPMENT
CHALLENGE, at ii (2011) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE].
106 Id.
107 U.N. Office on Drug & Crime, Intentional Homicide Count and Rate per 100,000
Population, by Country/Territory (2000-2012), UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/documents/
100
101
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There are many causes of these high murder rates as well as
the high rates of crime in general. Chief among them are drug
trafficking and violence associated with gang activity.108 While
drug trafficking is a central cause of violence in all three
countries, a larger percentage of the violence in El Salvador can
be attributed to gangs.109 Many of the gangs in Central America
have their roots in the United States. The Central American
armed conflicts of the 1980s caused hundreds of thousands of
Central Americans to flee to the United States.110 Economic
marginalization led a small minority of these migrants to join or
form gangs.111 When some of these individuals were deported
back to their home countries in the 1990s, they continued their
criminal activities and recruited others to join.112 As a result,
gangs in certain Northern Triangle countries “control large
neighborhoods in the most important cities.”113
Additional—and intertwined—causes of the rise in violence
in the Northern Triangle include the availability of arms and
weak states that are unable to provide a security apparatus and
judicial process to sufficiently remedy perceived injustice.114 The
availability of arms is a product of the regional conflicts of the
1980s, which created a culture of violence.115 Central America is
“awash in weapons,” with an estimated 4.5 million firearms
throughout the region in 2007.116 The weakness of the
governments in the Northern Triangle exacerbates the level of

gsh/data/GSH2013_Homicide_count_and_rate.xlsx (last visited Sept. 2, 2014) [hereinafter
UNODC, Homicide Stats]. But cf. WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note
105, at 1 (noting that the murder rate in El Salvador in 2006 was 58 per 100,000
inhabitants).
108 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105; see also ANDREW SELEE
ET AL., WILSON CTR. & MIGRATION POLICY CTR., CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO AND
CENTRAL AMERICA: AN EVOLVING BUT INCOMPLETE US POLICY RESPONSE 1 (2013) (noting
that organized crime gives cover to “unorganized crime”).
109 Joaquín Villalobos, Violence in Central America, in RETHINKING THE “WAR ON
DRUGS” THROUGH THE US-MEXICO PRISM 69 (Ernesto Zedillo & Haynie Wheeler eds.,
2012); see also SELEE ET AL., supra note 108, at 4 (reviewing evidence that establishes a
connection between transshipment drug routes and homicides). Others have cautioned
that ambiguities in data collection and classification make it hard to state definitively the
percentage of crime that stems from gang activity. WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT
CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at 15–16.
110 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at 15.
111 Id.
112 Id.; see also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 27 (2012) (discussing the origins of Mara
Salvatrucha in the 1980s).
113 Villalobos, supra note 109, at 69.
114 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at ii–iii; SELEE ET AL.,
supra note 108, at 1.
115 WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at iii.
116 Id.
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violence because it permits criminals to act with impunity
without significant fear of punishment.117
Quite distinct from the causes of the turmoil in the Northern
Triangle, however, is the question of whether these
circumstances are a cause of the recent spike in UAC border
crossings and claims of persecution and torture among those
subject to expedited removal. A potentially useful means to gauge
causation is to assess whether a spike in the homicide rate
occurred around the time the credible fear claims and UAC
border crossings began to increase. As noted above, in 2006, El
Salvador’s homicide rate was 64.4 for every 100,000 residents.
The murder rate in Guatemala was 45.3, and in Honduras it was
44.3. In 2010, the murder rate in Guatemala had fallen slightly
to 41.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In El Salvador, the
rate held steady at 64.1, while in Honduras the murder rate
spiked to nearly 82, making Honduras’s murder rate “the highest
in the world.”118 In 2012, as the credible fear claims and UAC
border crossings began to escalate, the murder rates in Honduras
further climbed to 90.4, while the rate in Guatemala held fairly
steady at 39.9, and the homicide rate in El Salvador fell
significantly to 41.2; the reported reduction in the homicide rate
in El Salvador correlates with an organized gang truce in early
2012.119

117 See WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 90 (2010)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE ] (illustrating stagnant or decreased trust
in the justice system and police force in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala from 2004
to 2008); see also Karen Musalo et al., Crimes Without Punishment: Violence Against
Women in Guatemala, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 163 (2010) (noting the low rate of
prosecution against murderers when the victims are female).
118 Villalobos, supra note 109, at 64 (providing a murder rate that differs slightly
from UNODC’s data); see also UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107.
119 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUG & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE, at 45–46, 126, U.N.
Sales No. 14.IV.1 (2013) [hereinafter UNODC, 2013 GLOBAL STUDY], available at http://
www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf; COMM.
ON MIGRATION OF THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MISSION TO CENTRAL
AMERICA: THE FLIGHT OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES 3 (2013).
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Table 3: Homicide Rates in the Northern Triangle (per
100,000 Inhabitants)120
Annual
Homicide
Rates

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Honduras

44.3

50.0

60.8

70.7

81.8

91.4

90.4

Guatemala

45.3

43.4

46.1

46.5

41.6

38.6

39.9

El Salvador

64.4

57.1

51.7

70.9

64.1

69.9

41.2

The increased murder rate in Honduras would seem to
support the conclusion that an escalation in homicides could be
representative of the general insecurity that provided an impetus
for the surges. It would not appear that the same can be said for
El Salvador, which actually has the highest number of people
subject to expedited removal who claim to fear persecution or
torture.121 Numbers, however, can be misleading, and there are a
couple reasons to view the reported murder rate decline with a
grain of salt. First, decisions to flee are not made in a
macro-statistical bubble. The murder rates in El Salvador were
very high in 2011 and prior years, and the decision to flee could
be based on the confluence of what residents perceived over the
course of the preceding years. Indeed, in surveys administered in
2012 and 2013 in El Salvador, nearly half the respondents did
not believe the gang truce reduced crime.122 Nevertheless, the
available data demonstrates substantially fewer Salvadorian
credible fear referrals toward the end of 2010 and throughout
2011, even though the murder rate had been high for many
years.123
Second, and more importantly, the drop in recorded murder
rates in El Salvador was at best temporary and at worst illusory.
Officials in El Salvador have reported a rise in the murder rate
120

107.

The data for this table was obtained from UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note

See, e.g., USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9.
See UNODC, 2013 GLOBAL STUDY, supra note 119, at 46 (noting that 2012 and
2013 surveys indicate that only half the population believed the gang truce reduced
crime).
123 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2011 (2011) [hereinafter USCIS 2011 CREDIBLE
FEAR STATISTICS], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/
Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2011/CredibleFearandReasonableFearWork
load.pdf (reporting that from October 2010 through 2011, between 100 and 200
Salvadorians were usually referred per month).
121
122
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since May 2013, which accelerated in 2014.124 In December 2013,
authorities discovered secret mass graves.125 These graves, along
with rises in disappearances during the time of the purported
truce,126 bring into question whether the gang truce significantly
reduced the murder rate at any point. Based on this data, it
appears that the murder rates now comport to the recorded
averages in 2011 and the years immediately preceding. In this
respect, the murder rate in El Salvador is not trending in a
manner that is substantially distinct from Honduras and
Guatemala. Moreover, the reported homicides in Guatemala are
under-representative of the actual figures.127
Homicide victims, however, are not spread evenly
throughout the Northern Triangle countries. More refined data
compilations on murder rates indicate that certain pockets of the
Northern Triangle contain a disproportionate rate of murders per
capita;128 for example, in Choluteca, Honduras, the murder rate
per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010 was 21.8, while the rate in
Atlántida, Honduras during the same year was 131.3.129 Studies
have indeed shown that UACs are more likely to come from
regions within their countries where the murder rates are
particularly high.130

124 See Nelson Renteria, El Salvador Murders Surge as Gang Truce Fades, REUTERS,
Apr. 4, 2014, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/uk-elsalvador-crimeidUKBREA3302S20140404; Michael Lohmuller, El Salvador Murders Fall Slightly for
2013, but Rising Again, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/
news-briefs/el-salvador-murders-fall-slightly-in-2013-but-rising-again; Alexandra Alper et
al., El Salvador Gang Truce Wobbles as Violent Murders Mount, REUTERS, July 5, 2013,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/06/us-elsalvador-violence-idUSBRE96
501D20130706.
125 Miriam Wells, El Salvador Mass Graves Put Pressure on Gang Truce, INSIGHT
CRIME (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-mass-gravesput-pressure-on-gang-truce.
126 BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SEC., U.S. DEP ’T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR 2014 CRIME AND
SAFETY REPORT 1–2 (2014), available at https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReport
Details.aspx?cid=15771; see Hannah Stone, The Murky Question of Disappearances in El
Salvador: An El Faro Investigation, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.osac.gov/
pages/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=15771.
127 See BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA 2013 CRIME
AND SAFETY REPORT 1 (2013), available at https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReport
PDF.aspx?cid=13878 (“In the case of homicides, the [police do] not count homicides if the
victim left the crime scene alive and subsequently died as a result of injuries.”).
128 INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, FORCED
DISPLACEMENT AND PROTECTION NEEDS PRODUCED BY NEW FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND
CRIMINALITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 19–20, 22–23, 25–26 (2012), available at
http://www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Research%20Paper%20Ma
y%202012.pdf.
129 Id. at 25.
130 See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera et al., DHS: Violence, Poverty, Is Driving Children to
Flee Central America to U.S., PEW RES. CENTER (July 1, 2014), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-flee-centralamerica-to-u-s/; see also INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS ,
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A final potentially relevant issue to assessing the
significance of murder rates is whether there are any correlations
between short-term changes in the homicide rate and subsequent
fluctuations in the rate of claimants. The homicide rate in El
Salvador officially began to increase in May 2013.131 According to
reports on the monthly credible fear referral rate of Salvadorians
in 2013, there were 749 in March, 947 in April, 1000 in May,
1419 in June, and, in October, the referral rate remained high at
1552.132 Since the recorded murder rate continued to increase in
June and the credible fear referral rate spiked in June as well,
the data does demonstrate a correlation between reported
homicides and credible fear referrals. Nevertheless, a confluence
of additional factors might have influenced the numbers; further
study is needed to ascertain more precisely the significance of the
month-to-month credible fear referral trends, as well as the
monthly UAC data.133
Insecurity is not simply a product of the murder rate. It
could also be based on overall crime rates and a general belief
that the state cannot adequately provide protection against
criminal elements. Tracking the rates of other violent crimes,
however, is hard to accurately accomplish. The available data for
violent crimes, such as assault, robbery, and sexual violence, are
often incomplete, which makes it difficult to track trends over
multiple years.134 Additionally, countries and specific localities
may diverge in how they classify such crimes.135 Further
compounding the difficulties, there is extreme underreporting of
supra note 128, at 15–26; Dara Lind, These Two Maps Show the Violence Driving Central
American Children to the US, VOX (July 1, 2014), http://www.vox.com/
2014/7/1/5861908/child-migrants-are-fleeing-the-most-dangerous-places-on-earth-in-two.
131 Lohmuller, supra note 124.
132 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2013 (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2013/Jul
y%202013/FY13-CFandRF-stats2013-06-30.pdf [hereinafter USCIS 2013 CREDIBLE FEAR
STATISTICS]; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2014 (2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/Asy-Cre
dible-Reasonable-FearFY14-Q1.pdf. As of October 2014, USCIS’s FY 2013 Credible Fear
Workload Summary does not include monthly data from July 2013 to September 2013.
133 For example, the number of credible fear referrals was lower overall in FY 2012,
but the month-to-month figures for Salvadorians also show a substantial jump from May
2012 to June 2012. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP ’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20E
ngagements/2012/December%202012/Credible-Reasonable-workloadsFY12.pdf.
134 See, e.g., U.N. Office on Drug & Crime, Robbery at the National Level, Number of
Police-Recorded Offences (2013), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/
statistics/crime/CTS2013_Robbery.xls
[hereinafter
UNODC,
Robbery
Statistics]
(providing no data on the rate of robbery in Honduras from 2003 through 2010).
135 See WORLD BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 117, at 5.
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these crimes because, among other reasons, perceived police
ineptitude negates the motivation to seek redress.136
Consequently—and paradoxically—in some instances, increased
crime rates could be the result of heightened efforts by the State
to take the reporting seriously (and perception by citizens that
reporting will actually lead to a proactive response).137 The data
that is available does not demonstrate an overall increase or
decrease in crime rates that could confidently account for the
impetus to flee and seek refuge in the United States.138
Aside from the specific incidents of homicide and other
crimes, another potentially relevant cause of migration could be
how secure individuals feel in their home countries. The premise
here is that widespread perceptions of insecurity could fuel
migration even for those who have not been personally
victimized. Professors Hiskey, Malone, and Orcés have studied
the link between migration and perceptions of insecurity in the
Northern Triangle.139 The results of their surveys demonstrate
that even as rates of violence increased over the last decade
within the Northern Triangle, respondents’ perception of
insecurity actually decreased.140 The one exception was El
136 Id. at 10 (finding that, in 2008, between 58% and 73% of the victims of a crime in
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala did not report the incident); INTERNACIONAL CTR.
FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, supra note 128, at 15 (“[V]ictims interviewed
during the development of this study state that they do not denounce their cases before
the corresponding bodies for fear of being publicly identified or of being victimized again
by [organized crime] . . . .”).
137 See UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 46 (statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of
the Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops) (“With the increased
efforts by the Honduran government to stem communications from gang-leaders within
prisons, there are reports of increased violence as gangs fragment and mid-level criminal
operators compete for control.”).
138 For the limited data that is available, there does not appear to be a noticeable
increase in assault rates around the time when claims began to spike. In El Salvador, the
rate of assaults per 100,000 inhabitants was 76.2 in 2005, and 67.1 in 2012. U.N. Office
on Drug & Crime, Assault at the National Level, Number of Police -Recorded Offences
(2013), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/CTS2013_Assa
ult.xls. The data available for sexual assaults does depict an escalation in incidents in El
Salvador and Guatemala (although the data for Guatemala only covers 2011 and 2012).
U.N. Office on Drug & Crime, Total Sexual Offences Against Children at the National
Level, Number of Police Recorded Offences (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/CTS2013_SexualViolence.xls. For robberies, the rates
increased until 2009 but subsequently declined. UNODC, Robbery Statistics, supra note
134. The robbery rates in Guatemala decreased from 2004 to 2009, but there is no data
available subsequent to 2009. Id. Despite the lack of data UNODC was able to obtain, the
World Bank noted in a 2010 report that “[a]necdotal accounts suggest that armed robbery
has become increasingly common in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.” WORLD
BANK, CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 117, at 5, 8. If this were the case and the trend
continued subsequent to the report, it would buttress the significance of country
conditions as a basis for migrants to flee the Northern Triangle.
139 See Jonathan Hiskey et al., Violence and Migration in Central America,
AMERICASBAROMETER INSIGHTS, 2014, at 1.
140 Id. at 2–3.
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Salvador, where respondents’ fear of crime remained constant.141
The authors proffer that “Central Americans may have become
increasingly desensitized to high levels of crime, or made
behavioral adjustments in their daily lives to avoid victimization,
and thus are now less likely to feel unsafe in their
neighborhoods.”142
Reports appear to corroborate the professors’ desensitization
suggestion because, in recent years, organized gangs in the
Northern Triangle “have established themselves as an
alternative, if not primary, authority in parts of the countries.”143
A study conducted by the Internacional Centre for the Human
Rights of Migrants (“ICHRM”) also lends support to the
professors’ suggestion that citizens in the Northern Triangle are
not only altering their daily behavior, but rather that the
organized crime syndicates in the Northern Triangle have caused
significant internal displacement within the countries.144 The
ICHRM found that within the Northern Triangle, organized
criminal enterprises are carving out territory to facilitate their
illegal trades, leading to hot zones in the countries where
murder, extortion, kidnapping, trafficking, and other crimes are
particularly high.145 As organized criminal enterprises
accumulate more territory, citizens’ options to relocate within the
state diminish. The problem is particularly prominent in
Honduras, which
offers very few options for internal forced displacement, since
organized crime has appropriated a great quantity of territories in the
country. Maras or organized gangs are mainly present in the capital
cities . . . and the country’s commercial capital[,] . . . while drug cartels
operate in the east of the countries . . . and in some areas of the west
and northwest . . . .146

Of course, migrating to the United States might be seen as
more desirable than internal relocation. The potential benefits
include family reunification and economic opportunity.
Unsurprisingly, studies have shown that depressed economic
opportunities and family reunification are also factors that drive
migration from the Northern Triangle.147 The economic outlook in

Id. at 3 (comparing responses from 2004 through 2012).
Id. at 3–4.
UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 47 (statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of the
Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops).
144 INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF M IGRANTS, supra note 128, at 15.
145 Id. at 16–26.
146 Id. at 24.
147 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Children on the Run, 16–17 (Mar. 12, 2014)
[hereinafter UNHCR, Children on the Run].
141
142
143
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Northern Triangle countries is indeed bleak.148 While much of the
economic turmoil is intertwined with high crime rates, some of
the depressed economic conditions that cause individuals to
migrate are attributable to general market forces. For example,
Guatemalan migrants have been affected by the “demise in the
coffee industry in recent years.”149 Additionally, the global
recession spawned by the U.S. financial crisis in 2008
significantly impacted the Salvadorian economy because a
substantial percentage of the economy is dependent on
remittances from the United States.150
Surveys on national crime rates and overall perceptions of
insecurity do not necessarily account for demographic factors
such as age and gender. Violence in the Northern Triangle
appears to disproportionately impact younger members of the
population.151 The relevance of this disproportionate impact to
UACs is intuitive; for credible fear claimants, migrants as a
whole tend to be younger than the overall population.152 Young
migrants have conveyed a growing Hobson’s choice because of
criminals’ recruitment tactics. Reports indicate that children now
face the realization that they have to join gangs or risk
victimization because of gangs’ recruitment tactics, which makes
the decision to flee their only viable option.153 Over the last five
years in parts of Honduras, for example, “the number of kids
coming through the doors who are victims of violence has

148 See Child Poverty: A Priority Challenge, CHALLENGES (U.N. Int’l Children’s
Emergency Fund), May 2010, at 1, 7 (noting the extreme rates of child poverty in
Northern Triangle countries); Stephanie Gosk et al., Desperate Journey: Crime and
Poverty Drive Honduran Kids to U.S., NBC NEWS (July 7, 2014), http://www.nbc
news.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/desperate-journey-crime-poverty-drive-hond
uran-kids-u-s-n150011 (reviewing malnourishment and schooling rates among Honduran
children).
149 COMM. ON MIGRATION OF THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS , supra note
119, at 2.
150 Id.; see Villalobos, supra note 109, at 69.
151 See Julie Turkewitz, Fear Is Driving Young Men Across the U.S. Border, ATLANTIC
(June 20, 2014, 4:07 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/cred
ible-fear-whats-driving-central-americans-across-the-us-border/373158/ (“[G]angs . . . feed
on the money and manpower that youths provide, and pursue them with an
almost-religious persistence.”).
152 See Alex Arnold et al., Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as
Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas, AMERICASBAROMETER INSIGHTS, 2011,
at 1, 3 (noting that aging members of the population are less likely to “leave their
homeland to move to another country”).
153 See Turkewitz, supra note 151; Moni Basu, Daniel’s Journey: How Thousands of
Children Are Creating a Crisis in America, CNN (June 19, 2014, 5:42 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/13/us/immigration-undocumented-children-explainer/ (noting
how “[g]ang members [have] infiltrated public schools” in El Salvador).

Do Not Delete

362

2/15/2015 7:58 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:2

tripled,” and pediatricians have “had to become . . . expert[s] at
repairing the damage bullets do to children.”154
A study published by the United Nations in 2014 found that
children from Northern Triangle countries have noted security
concerns as a basis for fleeing with much greater frequency in
recent years.155 The study is based on interviews the U.N.
conducted with children who fled Mexico and the Northern
Triangle around the time of the surge. In a previous 2006 study,
only 13% of children mentioned “international protection
concerns” as a basis for migrating.156 “International protection
concerns” include “violence in society predominantly by armed
criminal actors, and abuse in the home.”157 In the interviews
conducted between 2011 and 2013 for the 2014 study, 53% of
children voiced comparable reasons for migrating.158 The
numbers were not spread evenly between the three Northern
Triangle countries. Twenty percent of children from Guatemala
mentioned violence as a basis for fleeing, while 43% from
Honduras made similar claims and a staggering 69% of children
from El Salvador indicated that violence formed a basis for
fleeing.159 A plurality of those interviewed stated that they had
already experienced actual harm or the threat of harm from
gangs or other criminals.160 Boys were more likely to report
violence generally while girls were more likely to report actual or
threatened sexual violence.161 While the study documents rising
security concerns, it also makes clear that family reunification
and greater opportunities drive many children to migrate to the
United States.162
As a final point, regardless of whether depressed economic
conditions, deteriorating security concerns, or domestic violence
is responsible, the rate of asylum requests by individuals from
Northern Triangle countries is also worth mentioning. The U.N.
has calculated that since 2009, “Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica and Belize documented a 435% increase in the
154 Gosk et al., supra note 148; see Robles, supra note 11 (noting that the majority of
children live in gang-controlled areas); see also James Bargent, Honduras Extortion
Gangs Undergoing Violent Leadership Crisis, INSIGHT CRIME (June 3, 2014),
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/honduras-extortion-gangs-undergoing-violent-lea
dership-crisis (noting that attempts to crack down on gang leaders in prison has led to the
splintering of the organizational structure and increased violence).
155 UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 24.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 25.
160 Id. at 26.
161 Id. at 27.
162 Id. at 7–10.
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number of asylum applications lodged by individuals from El
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.”163
On the whole, the numbers indisputably demonstrate a dire
situation in the Northern Triangle. Crime rates are high, gangs
and other criminal entities run rampant, economic opportunities
are limited, and the governments have largely shown themselves
incapable of curtailing the violence. Much of the data indicates
that the conditions in the Northern Triangle have been grim for
many years, while other data suggests that certain
circumstances have worsened since the surge commenced.
B. Word of Mouth
A recurring basis asserted to explain the surges has been
what can be referred to as the word of mouth effect. Individuals
learn about actual or allegedly successful ways to enter the
United States and mimic the pattern that has been successful.
Recent reports concerning the migrant community from the
frontlines of the southwestern border have provided firsthand
accounts of how the word of mouth effect is fueling migration
from the Northern Triangle.164 One article reported that
“[m]igrants have sent word back home they received a ‘permit’ to
remain at least temporarily in the United States, feeding rumors
along migrant routes and spurring others to embark on the long
journey.”165 Providing anecdotal support, a migrant explained, “I
heard in Guatemala that people were caught by immigration, but
then they let them go and gave them a permit.”166 Representative
Henry Cuellar, a Democrat who represents a Texas district that
borders Mexico, explained that there is a “perception” among
migrants “that if you step on American soil, they will give you a
piece of paper, you go to the bus station and you can go anywhere
in the United States. You’re free with that permiso.”167 This

Id. at 4.
See, e.g., Illegal Immigrant: Reports in Central America Encourage Trek North,
KRGV.COM (June 3, 2014), http://www.krgv.com/news/illegal-immigrant-reports-in-cent
ral-america-encourage-trek-north/ (“[T]he message being disseminated in [Guatemala] is,
‘go to America with your child, you won’t be turned away.’”).
165 Julia Preston, Migrants Flow in South Texas, as Do Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2014, at A1.
166 Id.; see also Basu, supra note 153 (“[UACs] make no quarrels about getting
caught.”).
167 Preston, supra note 165; see also Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Border
Children Tell Their Stories: Why We Came to the US, NBC NEWS (June 12, 2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/border-children-tell-their-stories-why-we-ca
me-us-n129646 (noting rumors of “lax enforcement”); Kirk Semple, Surge in Child
Migrants Reaches New York, Overwhelming Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2014, at A19
(listing a cause of minors fleeing their home countries as “a perceived change in American
policy that would favor child immigrants”).
163
164
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perception can be seen by the fact that more and more migrants
have stopped trying to evade Border Patrol agents; rather, they
“run toward agents.”168
The question, then, is what is fueling the word of mouth
effect that has led people to believe that their chance to remain
in the United States has significantly increased. The suggested
potential factors diverge between credible fear claimants and
UACs.
1. Credible Fear Claims
In the context of the rise in credible fear claims, some of the
most commonly cited reasons for the word of mouth effect are
credible fear grant rates, U.S. detention policies, misinformation
about the benefits of a favorable credible fear determination, and
asylum grant rates. Each will be reviewed in turn.
a. Credible Fear Grant Rates
As noted above, some have asserted that a possible cause of
the increase in individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture
could be the high rate at which the Asylum Office is finding that
individuals have established a credible fear of persecution or
torture; a positive finding would make it less likely the
government would summarily deport a migrant who is otherwise
subject to expedited removal.169 Proponents of this argument
point to the fact that positive credible fear determinations have
been fairly high in recent years, averaging between 80% and
85%—and even around 90% when excluding cases not assessed
on the merits.170 Historically, however, there have been many
years where the credible fear grant rates met or exceeded those
accompanying the current surge in claims, but a comparably high
request rate did not materialize. For example, the credible fear
grant rate hovered around 90% from 1999 to 2005, but the
number of referrals to the Asylum Office never increased by more
than a few thousand in any given year.171

Preston, supra note 165.
Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary) (attributing, in part, the credible fear surge to the
“virtual rubberstamping of applications”).
170 The grant rates reported by ICE may also not be entirely accurate or
representative. Advocacy groups have reported instances where U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) did not refer to the Asylum Office individuals who asserted a fear of
persecution. See, e.g., Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 141 (statement of American
Immigration Lawyers Association); HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at
11–12, 30–31. Conversely, others have stated that the high grant rate could be the result
of better screenings by CBP.
171 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.
168
169
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Aside from the grant rate itself, another proffered cause for
the surge in claims is the belief that officials have lowered the
standard needed to establish a credible fear of persecution.172 The
assertion that the Asylum Office incorrectly applies the credible
fear standard, however, is both overly simplistic and irrelevant.
The converse argument could also have been made when the
grant rate was low because, for many credible fear assessments,
the decisions are not based on clear-cut standards that assessors
can apply rigidly. Asylum evaluations entail matters of degree,
probability assessments, and reasonable disagreements about the
merits of claims—in addition to credibility determinations that
are difficult to render in a short timeframe. As a result, the
credible fear “significant possibility” language often imparts onto
decision makers the need to assess the probability of a
probability.173 For the nexus prong of asylum determinations, the
scope of conduct that falls within one of the protected grounds is
continuously evolving, and courts even disagree sometimes about
the scope of certain protected grounds.174 Thus, distinctions in
grant rates are more likely a product of two possibilities: how
much adjudicators choose to err on the side of caution and
whether the circumstances in applicants’ home countries altered
the viability of the proffered bases for asylum claims.
More relevant than the particular assessment threshold is
whether there has been a noticeable shift in the overall grant
rate. In a vacuum, the high grant rate in recent years is not itself
a significant contributing cause of the surge in claims, but the
distinction between the grant rate during the surge and the rate
before the surge could play a larger role. From 2006 to 2009, the
percentage of claims where the Asylum Office found a credible
fear was in the sixties.175 Subsequently, the grant rate quickly
accelerated to the seventies and eighties as the number of
credible fear claims began to rise.176 Thus, the current high grant
rates come on the coattails of a period in time in which the grant
rates were historically low. It could be argued that it is not so
much that the current grant rate is historically anomalous, but
172 Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz) (attributing the grant rate to “the
Obama administration’s undermining of the enforcement of our immigration law”).
173 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012) (providing the credible fear assessment
standard); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1987) (discussing the likelihood
of harm that applicants must demonstrate to establish a well -founded fear of
persecution); id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
174 Compare Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
Board’s particular social group construction is not entitled to deference), with
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with
aspects of the analysis in Gatimi).
175 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.
176 Id.
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rather that it jumped significantly in a short period of time—and
the migrating public might have taken notice of the grant rate
spike. Indeed, the rise in grant rates might have been
particularly significant for individuals from the Northern
Triangle, as their grant rates in the mid-2000s were particularly
low. For example, according to the Congressional Research
Service, in FY 2008, the Asylum Office only found that 40% of
Salvadorians had a credible fear of persecution or torture—a rate
that has since gone up.177 Noting this potential cause does not
necessarily impugn to migrators any nefarious intention. A
prospective migrant who learns that grants rates have increased
may reasonably factor this information into his or her decision to
flee a country with security woes and depressed economic
opportunities.
b. The Morton Memo and Detention Rates
The Morton Memo has been cited as a potential cause of the
surge in credible fear claims because ICE issued it in December
2009, which is around the time when individuals subject to
expedited removal began to assert a fear of persecution or torture
with greater frequency.178 The argument is that claimants are
more likely to assert a fear of persecution because the Morton
Memo expanded the criteria for parole eligibility. The data does
appear to show a rise in the percentage of eligible applicants that
ICE releases under its parole authority.179 ICE provided Human
Rights First with statistical data that indicates that the rate of
release on parole between FY 2004 and FY 2007 dropped from
41.3% to 4.2%.180 By FY 2012, the rate of release rose to 80%.181
Despite the increased release rate based on parole, the
Morton Memo’s limited scope minimizes the potential impact of
its change to detention practices. All migrants subject to
expedited removal can claim to fear persecution or torture, but
only “arriving aliens”—those apprehended at a port of entry—are
Id. at 70 (statement of Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service).
Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte).
See infra Table 4 for a compilation of the available parole data. Even if parole is
granted, release from detention may still require the detainee to post bond. See Asylum
Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 105–06 (statement of U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom).
180 HUMAN RIGHTS F IRST, U.S. D ETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 35 (2009) [hereinafter
HRF, ASYLUM DETENTION]; see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP ’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT TO CONGRESS: DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS FISCAL YEAR
2007, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter ICE 2007 DETENTION STATISTICS] (noting that in FY 2007
“67 percent of all aliens found to have met the ‘credible fear’ screening standard who were
detained had 90 or fewer days in detention”).
181 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 107 (statement of U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom) (recounting information that ICE provided to USCIRF).
177
178
179
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potentially eligible for parole.182 Most individuals subject to
expedited removal, however, are not considered arriving aliens.
The available data indicates that approximately 75% of
individuals claiming to fear persecution or torture are not
apprehended at a port of entry.183 In the first half of FY 2014, for
example, 16,428 of the 20,488 credible fear decisions concerned
individuals apprehended inland.184 Consequently, the detention
policies described in the Morton Memo only apply to
approximately 25% of individuals subject to expedited removal
who claim to fear persecution or torture. Thus, while there does
appear to be a substantial increase in the number of individuals
released on parole, the relatively low number of claimants to
whom ICE’s parole authority applies cautions against finding
that the Morton Memo’s detention policy changes are itself
significantly responsible for the increase in credible fear claims.
To more accurately assess the true impact of the Morton Memo,
DHS would need to provide data on the number of Northern
Triangle migrants who qualify as arriving aliens.
Regarding ICE’s detention practices more generally, a few
cautionary words are in order. The data available for measuring
detention rates are far from comprehensive. The information that
is available is often the product of formal or informal requests
made to DHS by advocacy groups for statistical data that cover
delineated time periods—or statistical data provided to the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”), an
independent government agency tasked with assessing DHS’s
detention practices as they pertain to the expedited removal
process.185 Thus, the obtained data does not cover many years
since DHS (and the former INS) began compiling statistics on
expedited removal and credible fear cases. Moreover, even for the
years when DHS publicized its detention data, the information
does not always appear to consistently quantify the detention
status of asylum seekers subject to expedited removal. DHS has
noted that the “proportions in various outcomes classes are not
strictly comparable” to the data compiled in previous years.186
See MORTON MEMO, supra note 68, ¶¶ 1–4.
See, e.g., USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9; USCIS 2013
CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 132.
184 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9.
185 USCIRF was established by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. See
1 USCIRF 2005 REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.
186 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS: FISCAL YEARS 2009 AND 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2012)
[hereinafter ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION S TATISTICS ]; Asylum Fraud: Abusing America’s
Compassion?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Border Sec. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 116 (2014) [hereinafter Asylum Fraud Hearing]
(providing a copy of ICE’s FY 2012 report on detained asylum seekers).
182
183
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Additionally, the methodology DHS uses to classify detention
status has changed over the years.187 Also worth noting, because
detention data takes into account the initial detention decision
and the ultimate release rates for applicants who might have
been detained initially, the detention and custody counts differ
from the number of credible fear decisions made in a particular
fiscal year. Given the shortcomings in the data, this Article can
only use the information obtained to illustrate general detention
trends and to assess the proportional use of certain detention and
release methods.
Table 4 provides a summary of the available data. The first
two columns provide the number of credible fear claimants who
were and were not detained. For those who were detained, the
remainder of Table 4 lists the reasons why ICE eventually
released them.
Table 4: Detention and Release Rate Data for Credible
Fear Claimants188
NOT DET DET

REASN FOR RLEASE
BOND DEP

DETN OR

OS

OTHR PARO USM TR

VD WD XFER

FY 2006

4461

257

41

143

28

2

4

N/A

16

0

13

3

0

7

FY 2007

605

4614

1502

2031

81

355

68

N/A

207

5

277

23

22

43

FY 2009

5386

5317

1972

1441

487

403

164

254

284

15

N/A

10

28

259

FY 2010

9291

9041

4272

1721

648

415

200

163

1095

31

N/A

13

6

475

FY 2012

816

14,525 ≈4969 ≈2393 ≈881

1175

25

N/A

26

1

≈793

≈3841 ≈242 ≈175

*NOT
DET=not
detained;
DET=detained;
REASN
FOR
RLEASE=reason why ICE released a detained migrant;
BOND=released on Bond; DEP=released for removal from the United
States; DETN=detained; OR=released on recognizance; OS=released

187 Compare U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT R EPORTS 333 (2005) [hereinafter 2 USCIRF
2005 REPORT ] (defining the categories that comprise “release” and “held” determinations),
with ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 46 (defining the terms
used in 2009).
188 For the data used to compile Table 4, see Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186,
at 117, 138 (providing the credible fear statistics in ICE’s FY 2012 report on detained
asylum seekers); ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 4, 46; ICE
2007 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 180, at 4 (providing summary data only); U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT TO
CONGRESS: DETAINED A SYLUM SEEKERS FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 4 (2007) [hereinafter ICE
2006 DETENTION STATISTICS ]. Some of the figures for FY 2012 are estimations because the
PDF version of the report in the congressional record blurs some of the release rate
numbers. See Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 138. The definitions of the
reasons for release come from the reports. Because ICE modified its release categories,
Table 4 includes the notation “N/A” when a certain category is not applicable in a given
fiscal year.
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on an order of supervision; OTHR=includes escaped, lack of funds to
detain, lack of space, and all cases deemed unclassified for release
details; PARO=paroled into the United States; TR=released, case
terminated; USM=released to U.S. Marshals; VD=released for
voluntary departure from the United States; WD=released, alien
withdraws application; XFER=transferred between facilities;
N/A=category not applicable within that fiscal year.

The available data does not establish a definitive trend for
general detention rates. To the contrary, it appears quite
haphazard. As Table 4 illustrates, ICE detained very few
claimants in FY 2006. By contrast, ICE initially detained nearly
all credible fear claimants in FY 2007. In FYs 2009 and 2010,
however, ICE only detained approximately 50% of claimants.
Changing course once again in FY 2012, ICE initially detained
almost all credible fear claimants. The basis for the fluctuation in
initial detention determinations is unclear. It could be the result
of policy changes or inconsistent methodologies employed by ICE
to code the data.189 Moreover, ICE does not provide any
additional data on the release of those who were not detained,
which would help to obtain a more accurate understanding of its
detention practices.
Perhaps more germane than the general detention rates are
the release rates and the average length of detention. In 2001,
the government released prior to their hearing date in
immigration court 86.1% of claimants found to have a credible
fear of persecution or torture.190 By 2003, the release rate had
fallen to 62.5%.191 In FY 2006, ICE released nearly all claimants
within ninety days.192 While not publically available, groups that
have seen the release rates for FY 2007 estimate that it dropped
to 44.7%, which would coincide with ICE’s incredibly low use of
its parole authority in FY 2007.193 In FYs 2009, 2010, and 2012,
ICE again released almost all detainees, and the vast majority
were released within ninety days.194 Thus, the data shows that
generally low release rates in FY 2007 increased thereafter and
remained consistently high through FY 2012. The data also

189 For instance, since authorities must detain migrants subject to expedited removal
prior to a credible fear determination by the Asylum Office, it is possible that ICE has
modified how it accounts for detention during this time period. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012).
190 2 USCIRF 2005 REPORT, supra note 187.
191 Id.
192 ICE 2006 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 188, at 6.
193 HRF, ASYLUM DETENTION, supra note 180, at 35.
194 Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 136; ICE 2009 & 2010 DETENTION
STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 44.
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generally shows that most claimants were not detained for very
long.
In sum, based on the available data, it appears that release
rates have significantly increased for arriving aliens. More
generally, it also appears that release rates have increased since
FY 2007, but given the lenient detention practices in FY 2006,
the current detention practices are not unprecedented.
c. The Implications of Credible Fear Grants
As reviewed above, the credible fear screening standard is
much lower than the ultimate standard adjudicators use to
determine if an applicant is entitled to asylum. Nevertheless,
media reports and political organizations have incorrectly stated
that credible fear grants constitute “temporary asylum” or
otherwise imply that a credible fear grant provides an
opportunity to obtain benefits greater than what it actually
provides.195 Advocacy groups have noted, however, that “[t]his
kind of misinformation can then be circulated through social
media and word of mouth, potentially encouraging people to
make decisions based on inaccurate information.”196 Accordingly,
reports on the perceived benefits of credible fear grants might
contribute to the word of mouth effect in this context.
d. Asylum Grant Rates
A final potential contributor to the word of mouth effect
concerns asylum grant rates and whether an increased likelihood
of success could incentivize individuals from the Northern
Triangle to migrate to the United States and express a fear of
persecution. Table 5 provides the grant and denial rates in
immigration court for Northern Triangle asylum seekers. There
are, however, numerous additional categories not provided here,
such as the number of applicants who abandon their claims.

195 See, e.g., Immigration: Claims for Asylum Soar in 2013, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec.
13, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/12/13/Immigration-Claims-for-asylumsoar-in-2013/UPI-12891386944160/; Brian Bennett, Immigration Claims for Asylum Soar,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/12/news/la-pn-immi
gration-asylum-claims-soar-20131212.
196 HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES , supra note 78, at 17.
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Table 5: Asylum Grant Rate for Northern Triangle
Countries197
El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Year

Granted

Denied

Granted

Denied

Granted

Denied

FY 2009

100

1049

123

1034

34

347

FY 2010

123

923

131

894

56

321

FY 2011

137

1141

145

851

58

421

FY 2012

158

971

192

823

77

388

FY 2013

181

1186

153

829

92

575

For all three countries, the data establishes that the grant
rates are exceptionally low. Additionally, the figures show little
to no escalation in the grant rate immediately preceding or
during the surge. Accordingly, it does not appear that asylum
grant rates have contributed to the surge.
2. UAC Border Crossings
For UACs, many suggest that the word of mouth effect is the
product of several recent legislative and policy changes to
immigration law and enforcement, as well as accompanying
attempts by criminal organizations to exploit real and perceived
changes to the law.198 TVPRA and the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals are the two changes considered most
responsible for spreading word that deportation is less likely to
occur or not likely to happen at all.
a. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
As noted above, TVPRA provides that “an unaccompanied
alien child in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services shall be promptly placed in the least restrictive setting
that is in the best interest of the child.”199 For children from
noncontiguous countries such as those of the Northern Triangle,
TVPRA—for
quite
legitimate
reasons—diminishes
the

197 To view the source from which Table 5’s data is derived, see OFFICE OF PLANNING,
ANALYSIS & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,
IMMIGRATION COURTS ASYLUM STATISTICS FY 2009–2013 (2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY2009-FY2013AsylumStatisticsbyNationality.pdf.
198 See, e.g., Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; Carle Hulse, Migrant Surge Traced to
Law on Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2014, at A1.
199 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (2012).
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government’s ability to quickly deport minors. The premise of
these repatriation hurdles is to protect victims of human
trafficking.200 The surge in UAC border crossings, however,
might be “classic unintended consequences” of the desire to
protect potential victims of human trafficking.201 Interviewed
migrants and immigration officials have indicated that the lower
rate of deportation of minors over the past few years has indeed
created the perception that DHS’s deportation policy toward
UACs has changed.202
b. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
The second basis cited as a potential reason for the UAC
surge is DACA—the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.203
DACA is an administrative policy issued by DHS in 2012 that
instructs officials to defer the removal of certain minors who may
benefit from the previously proposed DREAM Act.204 DACA,
however, does not apply to minors crossing the border during the
current surge.205 Studies have suggested that the migratory rates
of UACs from the Northern Triangle immediately following the
creation of DACA actually decreased.206 Nevertheless, there have
been reports that smuggling organizations may be employing
misinformation about legal remedies, including DACA, to
convince young migrants to attempt the often dangerous journey
to the United States.207 The evidence regarding the significance
of DACA as an incentive to migrate, however, is largely
anecdotal.
3. Smuggling Organizations
Politicians, researchers, and news reports often note the
possibility that those who facilitate unauthorized border
crossings or physically take part in smuggling migrants are
Id. § 1232(a)(1).
Hulse, supra note 198; see also Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (noting the
potential perception since TVPRA that the United States treats UACs differently).
202 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (providing the reduced deportation rates);
Robles, supra note 11 (noting the perception).
203 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 5–6.
204 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/
offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people.pdf.
205 Id.
206 See Wong, supra note 17, at 4–5.
207 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; see also Caitlin Dickson, How Mexico’s Cartels
Are Behind the Border Kid Crisis, DAILY BEAST (July 9, 2014), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/articles/2014/06/23/how-mexico-s-cartels-are-behind-the-border-kid-crisis.html;
Seville & Rappleye, supra note 167.
200
201
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responsible for communicating information that has contributed
to both surges.208 Unlike the potential causes previously
discussed, such communications are not a root cause of the surge
but rather a means to further spread word about the actual and
perceived changes to law and policy that were previously
discussed.209 It is in smugglers’ interest to spread word because
heightened interest in migrating contributes to the industry’s
multi-billion dollar enterprise and can even help facilitate
smugglers’ narcotics trade.210 Smuggling organizations often take
advantage of perceived weaknesses in the entry process and help
migrants exploit them;211 right now, the credible fear process and
UAC laws could be perceived as potential weaknesses.212 As to
why the surge took years to materialize, migration experts have
suggested that “[i]t took a little time for word to get back to
Central America and other countries about those protections, as
well as for criminal organizations to develop smuggling
infrastructure around them.”213 It is likely that smuggling
organizations have played some role in facilitating the surge. The
extent of that role, however, is not readily discernible.
C. The Prospect of Immigration Reform
For both UACs and those claiming to credibly fear
persecution or torture, another basis could potentially be
208 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Central American Presidents Say U.S. Shares
Responsibility for Migration Crisis, NPR (July 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/07/24/334942174/central-american-presidents-say-u-s-shares-responsibility-formigration-crisis (relaying the President of Honduras’s belief that one of many
contributors to the surge is “human smugglers telling families in Honduras that they
could stay in the U.S. if they make it past the border”).
209 E. Eduardo Castillo & Christopher Sherman, Migration Spotlights Mexican
‘Coyote’ Smugglers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 21, 2014, available at http://big
story.ap.org/article/migration-spotlights-mexican-coyote-smugglers (noting how some
have suggested that coyotes help spread word that it is now easier to enter and remain in
the United States).
210 U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT A SSESSMENT, at 59, U.N. Sales No. E.10.IV.6
(2010) (estimating that the annual income for smugglers is $6.6 billion); Dickson, supra
note 207 (discussing how traffickers use migrants as diversions).
211 See Daniel González, Immigrants from India Surge Across Arizona Border,
REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130907immi
gration-arizona-border-indian.html (noting a sharp rise in similar credible fear claims
that experts believe may be attributable to smuggling organizations).
212 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 186 (statement of Michael J. Fisher,
Chief, U.S. Border Patrol).
213 Suzanne Gamboa, Too Many, Too Fast: Border Children Swamping Agents, NBC
NEWS (June 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/too-many-too-fast-border-child
ren-swamping-agents-n126751 (recounting the sentiments of Marc Rosenblum, deputy
director of the Migration Policy Institute’s U.S. immigration program); see also Asylum
Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 71 (statement of Hipolito M. Acosta, former District
Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) (discussing the link between UACs,
smugglers, and drug cartels).
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contributing to the surge in claims and border crossings: the
possibility of immigration reform in the near future.214 Many
migrants might well be aware that current U.S. immigration law
does not provide them with a legal basis to remain in the United
States permanently. They may believe, however, that prospective
immigration reform could provide them with a path to legal
status. In this respect, they are willing to ride it out and wait to
see if immigration reform materializes—even though a path to
legal status may be premised on a certain length of continuous
residence in the United States that they likely cannot satisfy.215
D. Border Security and Fraud
Some appear to partially attribute the surge to perceived lax
security at the southwestern border.216 The data, however, does
not support this claim. Border enforcement spending has
increased, as have the number of border patrol agents.217 More
importantly though, credible fear claimants and UACs do not
typically try to evade border patrol agents.218 Consequently,
while many of the above-discussed potential causes may have
impacted the surge, perceived lax border security does not appear
to be a relevant factor.
Conversely, and seemingly paradoxically, some have
partially attributed the surge to heightened enforcement efforts
at the border.219 The premise is that a larger border patrol
presence has caused migrants to seek alternate means to gain
entry to the United States. For credible fear claimants, the
government’s increased use of expedited removal could cause
more migrants to allege a fear of persecution or torture, since a
credible claim provides one of the only means at migrants’
disposal to avoid deportation when they are otherwise subject to
expedited removal.220
214 Jim Dwyer, A 12-Year-Old’s Trek of Despair Ends in a Noose at the Border, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at A1 (“The prospect of immigration reform in the United States is
also enticing . . . because of the belief that anyone already in the country illegally will be
allowed to stay.”).
215 For example, the proposed 2013 Senate bill would only authorize a path to
citizenship for certain unauthorized immigrants who resided in the United States before
December 31, 2011.
216 See, e.g., UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 2; see also DAN RESTREPO & ANN
GARCIA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SURGE OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM
CENTRAL AMERICA: ROOT CAUSES AND POLICY SOLUTIONS 3 (2014) (recounting the border
security argument proffered by several lawmakers).
217 See U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. D EP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER PATROL AGENT
STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (2013), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Staffing Statistics 1992-2013.pdf.
218 See Preston, supra note 165.
219 See HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at 1.
220 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 143 (statement of ACLU et al.).
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This potential cause raises numerous questions about the
meaning and extent of “fraud” in the surge. Critics of the current
surge often allege rampant fraud, stating that migrants
“abuse”221 and “game the system.”222 But are these migrants
committing fraud? There are several categories that have to be
distinguished. First are those who take advantage of U.S. laws
and policies that apply to them and plan to pursue their claims in
accordance with the law. For example, if a prospective migrant
fears, or has experienced, unspeakable harm in his home country
and learns of a process that can more readily allow him to stay in
the United States on the basis of this harm, he is not engaged in
fraud simply because he takes advantage. Second are those who
have no viable claim and purposefully choose to game the
process. For example, some internal CBP reports allege “Mexican
drug cartel members are abusing the credible fear process to
bypass regular immigration checks in order [to] get into the
country.”223 Other reports have noted how gang members are
trying to enter the United States as UACs. 224 Migrants falling
within the second category are unequivocally committing fraud.
There are many other categories between these two
extremes. Some migrants have experienced hardships in their
home countries, but their experiences may not unequivocally fit
within a legally permissible box, so they alter their stories.
Others might have viable claims that could permit them to
remain in the United States, but they have no intention to
adhere to the requirements the law imposes on them. Indeed, a
percentage of migrants released into the country do not show up
for their subsequent immigration hearings.225 There are many
derivations of the above-mentioned categories.
To be sure, a certain amount of fraud is typically a byproduct
of any government program.226 Accurate data on the extent of
Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz).
Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte).
Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz); see id. at 186 (statement of Rep. Ted
Poe); see also id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (recounting reports that claimants
are being coached to game the system).
224 James Bargent, Flood of Child Migrants into US Could Include MS13 Gang
Members, INSIGHT CRIME (July 14, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/floodof-child-migrants-into-us-could-include-ms13-gang-members.
225 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (“[A]n estimated 30 percent of unaccompanied
minors are ordered removed in absentia because they fail to appear at their initial or later
hearings.”).
226 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 191 (statement of Rep. Luis V.
Gutierrez) (noting that the government would not end unemployment compensation
simply because there are instances of fraud); see also Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note
186, at 11 (statement of Louis D. Crocetti, Jr., Principal, Immigration Integrity Group)
(noting that internal DHS studies found conclusive evidence of fraud in about 12% of
cases).
221
222
223
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actual fraud as a contributor to the surge, however, is not
currently available.227 To illustrate, conservative news outlets
have purportedly obtained from immigration agents “cheat
sheets” near the border that provide migrants with lists of
commonly asked questions and suggested answers to make out a
viable claim.228 Determining the authenticity of such documents,
however, is difficult to do. Although it purportedly came from a
federal law enforcement official, there appears to be infighting
within DHS components that is leading to the dissemination of
contradictory information.229 This infighting, along with DHS’s
general reluctance to make public information regarding ongoing
investigations or politically sensitive topics, undermines the
ability to accurately assess the data. Thus, this Article’s causal
conclusions in Part IV are premised on the concession that a
greater understanding of the extent of any fraud could alter the
calculus.230
IV. ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE CAUSES
This Article concludes that the word of mouth effect and, to a
lesser extent, changes in country conditions in the Northern
Triangle, have primarily caused the surge in crossings by
credible fear claimants and UACs. Regarding the country
conditions in the Northern Triangle, economic and crime data
certainly paint a bleak picture,231 but the region-wide data does
not itself indicate that the overall circumstances deteriorated
significantly around the time of the surge. For instance, the
murder rates in Guatemala actually decreased as the United
States began to record a spike in credible fear claims. 232
Regarding Salvadorians, credible fear referral rates remained

227 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren)
(noting the inability to decipher at this stage whether fraud is responsible for the surge).
228 See Sara Carter, This Is a ‘Cheat Sheet’ Found at the Border to Coach Illegals on
How to Stay in the U.S., BLAZE (June 26, 2014), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/06/
26/this-is-a-cheat-sheet-found-at-the-border-to-coach-illegals-on-how-to-stay-in-the-u-s/.
229 See, e.g., Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 178–79 (statement of Michael J.
Fisher, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol) (disputing the National Border Patrol Council’s
assessment of agency policy on certain matters).
230 As a final point on potential causes, it appears that apprehension rates are not a
contributing factor. Ruth Ellen Wasem of the Congressional Research Service noted that
apprehension rates of migrants from the Northern Triangle were also high in 2005, but
there was no accompanying surge in claims. Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at
69− 70.
231 See WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, supra note 105, at 4–9; see also
UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107.
232 UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107 (listing the murder rates in the Northern
Triangle countries from 2006 through 2012); Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227;
see supra Table 1 (providing credible fear referral data); supra Table 3 (listing the murder
rates in the Northern Triangle countries from 2006 through 2012).
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relatively low in 2010 and 2011, even though El Salvador’s
homicide rate was consistently high during the preceding
years.233
Nevertheless, despite the countrywide data on countries in
the Northern Triangle, there are several signs of deteriorating
conditions on the ground around the time of the surges. First,
there are indications that the situation has gotten worse for
certain segments of the population such as children.234
Researchers who have studied migratory patterns have found
that a younger age significantly correlates to expressed
intentions to migrate, which would impact both UACs and
credible fear claimants.235 Second, the hometowns and regions
from which many migrants fled have murder rates well above the
country averages, which supports the conclusion that
inter-country regional crime distinctions can trump national
figures or exacerbate their deleterious consequences.236
Third, there are indications that gangs and other criminal
entities are accumulating more territory, which decreases
citizens’ ability to relocate internally.237 Fourth, since the
beginning of the surge, migrants from Northern Triangle
countries have requested asylum from countries other than the
United States at a higher rate.238 If migrants’ reasons for
departing their home countries were solely attributable to U.S.
policy rather than country conditions, then one would not expect
a concurrent spike in asylum requests in other countries.239 Fifth,
there is some indication that fluctuations in murder rates
correlate with migrants subject to expedited removal expressing
a fear of persecution. For example, the credible fear data depicts
a noticeable increase in Salvadorian claimants subsequent to the
apparent failing of the truce between rival gangs.240 The failure
USCIS 2011 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 123.
See UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 24.
Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 5. The researchers, however, have only found a
correlation for children sixteen and older, which shows that other factors account for the
rise in border crossings by minors who are younger than sixteen. Id.
236 Gonzalez-Barrera et al., supra note 130; see also INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, supra note 128, at 15–26; Lind, supra note 130.
237 INTERNACIONAL CTR. FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF M IGRANTS, supra note 128, at 24.
238 UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 15 (reporting a 432% increase in
neighboring countries since 2009); see also UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 47
(statement of Mark Seitz, Bishop of the Diocese of El Paso, Texas, U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops) (noting that since 2008, there has been a 712% increase in asylum
claims filed by Northern Triangle citizens in countries that surround the Northern
Triangle).
239 Unless, of course, a change in the pull factors in these countries around the time
of the surge also incentivized prospective asylum seekers to attempt to migrate there.
240 USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9; USCIS 2013 CREDIBLE
FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 132.
233
234
235
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of the truce also correlates with the rise in claims by Salvadorian
UACs (though not at a level that significantly distinguishes it
from other Northern Triangle countries).241
Sixth, unlike the official national murder rates in the region,
the data on countrywide perceptions of insecurity since the time
of the surge appear to correlate with the rate at which migrants
claim to fear persecution if returned to their home countries. 242
Referring back to the homicide data, unlike in Honduras, the
murder rate in El Salvador reportedly decreased from 2011 to
2012.243 Nevertheless, since the time when credible fear claims
began to spike, El Salvador has consistently been the primary
country of origin for individuals subject to expedited removal who
claim to fear persecution or torture.244 At the same time, El
Salvador is the only country in the Northern Triangle where
citizens’ perceptions of insecurity did not decrease when the
surge began.245 Thus, the connection between the number of
claimants at the border and perceptions of insecurity support the
conclusion that a security deterioration may have contributed to
the rise in claims. Regarding this sixth point, there are, however,
additional factors that may also contribute to the particularly
high number of Salvadorian claims. For instance, there is a
strong connection between remittance networks and intentions to
migrate.246 As noted above, El Salvador is also the country with
the highest remittance rate—a staggering one-third of the
country.247 Other Northern Triangle countries also have high
remittance rates.248
More generally, considering the six aforementioned signs
collectively, the data does point to several circumstances that
changed around the time of the surge, which demonstrates that
country conditions have played a role in the escalation. While
security concerns are undoubtedly a contributing factor, family
reunification and depressed economic conditions fully or partially

See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, supra note 10.
This correlation, however, does not apply as readily to the surge in UAC
claimants. See id.
243 UNODC, Homicide Stats, supra note 107.
244 See, e.g., USCIS 2014 CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS, supra note 9 (reporting that in
some months Salvadorians had nearly three times as many credible fear referrals as
claimants from the next country on the list).
245 Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 3.
246 Id. at 5 (reviewing the “friends and family effect”).
247 Villalobos, supra note 109, at 69.
248 See Daniel Reichman, Honduras: The Perils of Remittance Dependence and
Clandestine Migration, MIGRATION POL’Y INST . (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.migr
ationpolicy.org/article/honduras-perils-remittance-dependence-and-clandestine-migration
(noting that 17% of Honduras’s economy is based on remittances).
241
242
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motivated some migrants to leave the Northern Triangle,
particularly those coming from Guatemala.249
While country conditions have likely contributed to the
surge, those who claim they are solely responsible for the rise in
these particular types of claims are incorrect.250 The conditions in
the Northern Triangle are simply not analogous to situations in
countries such as Syria, where the destabilization of the
government and escalation in violence caused millions to flee the
country irrespective of the conditions that awaited them in
refugee camps.251 Rather, the word of mouth effect appears to
have impacted the migratory spike for credible fear claimants
and UACs.
Starting with the rise in credible fear claimants, this Article
reviewed several potential reasons why word has spread in the
Northern Triangle that migrants could more easily obtain
permission to enter the United States: increased credible fear
grant rates, decreased detention rates, the characterizations of
credible fear grant benefits by smugglers and others, and higher
asylum grant rates. The high credible fear grant rates since the
time of the surge do not, in and of themselves, appear to provide
a significant basis to account for the rise in claims. As mentioned
above, comparably high grant rates in the past did not result in
concurrent spikes in claims.252
The credible fear grant rates, however, were substantially
lower for several years prior to the rise in claims.253 Thus, the
rise in the grant rate could be a contributing factor, particularly
because the grant rate was notably low for certain Northern
Triangle claimants prior to the escalation.254 For the rising grant
rate to be impactful, however, claimants must actually obtain
asylum (or related relief) or be released during the pendency of

249 For example, a significant percentage of children interviewed by the U.N. listed
“family or opportunity” as a reason why they decided to leave. UNHCR, Children on the
Run, supra note 147, at 7–10. The data shows that children from Guatemala, in
particular, are much more likely to migrate because of family or greater opportunities
than violence in society. Id. at 10.
250 See Wong, supra note 17, at 1.
251 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Syria Regional Refugee Response,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Aug. 21, 2014) (stating
that approximately 3 million refugees have fled Syria since 2012); see also Miguel
Almaguer & Elisha Fieldstadt, Is Trek of Undocumented Immigrant Children Safer than
Staying Home?, NBC NEWS (July 6, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immi
gration-border-crisis/trek-undocumented-immigrant-children-safer-staying-home-n149151
(“Countries surrounding Syria have welcomed 2.5 million refugees, but ‘we get 90
thousand immigrant children and we start talking about expedited removal.’”).
252 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 227.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 70 (statement of Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service).
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their claims; otherwise, a favorable credible fear determination
would produce little inherent benefit. Regarding the asylum
relief issue, the data produced in Table 5 demonstrates that
adjudicators consistently grant very few asylum claims filed by
Northern Triangle applicants. Accordingly, the grant rate would
not produce any perceived inherent benefit.
As to the detention issue, migrants could be incentivized by
the belief that the government would not detain them or would,
at the very least, quickly release them into the country. Absent
misinformation, migrants would not believe DHS would release
them if DHS detained individuals found to have a credible fear of
persecution during the pendency of their claims. Thus, it appears
that the primary significance of the rise in grant rates may be
inexorably linked to the significance of any change in detention
policy. (To say that detention rates may be a contributing cause
is quite different than advocating for increased detention, and by
analyzing the former this Article is by no means advocating the
latter.) The link between U.S. detention policies and migration
rates has some historical backing. For instance, immigration
officials working in South Texas in the 1980s noted how a similar
surge in border crossings immediately followed the government’s
decision to “institute[] a policy of releasing on recognizance aliens
from Central America who claimed they were fleeing violence
and persecution in their homeland.”255 In 2005, DHS
implemented a policy of detaining Brazilians crossing the
southwest border without authorization and the rate of migration
by Brazilian nationals dropped considerably.256
Regarding the current surge, the data does suggest some
changes in detention policy. There is undoubtedly a greater
chance that DHS will release arriving aliens because of the
Morton Memo.257 For detention more generally, in recent years
the rates of release have been high and the average length of
detention has been relatively short.258 As previously noted,
however, the release rates and lengths of detention are not
historically anomalous, which cautions against attributing to
them freestanding blame for the surge, wholly divorced from
other converging factors.259 Nevertheless, the data does appear to
255 Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 28 (statement of Hipolito M. Acosta,
former District Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services).
256 Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 64 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte)
(recounting the sentiments of former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff).
257 Id. at 107 (statement of U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom)
(noting that in FY 2012, 80% of eligible claimants received parole).
258 See, e.g., Asylum Fraud Hearing, supra note 186, at 136; ICE 2009 & 2010
DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 186, at 44.
259 See, e.g., ICE 2006 DETENTION STATISTICS, supra note 188, at 34.
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show that detention standards were somewhat relaxed after FY
2007, and this relaxation, combined with detention policy
changes for arriving aliens and increased credible fear grant
rates, could have all converged to impact external perception.
Indeed, regarding the current situation, the administration
appears to concede that its detention practices have likely
contributed to the current surge in migrants from Central
America.260
Unclear, however, is the extent of smugglers’ role in
facilitating migrants’ perceptions about the credible fear process.
Their role could be limited. Conversely, smugglers could have
more regularly spread word that the United States significantly
relaxed its detention practices for credible fear claimants based
on a misunderstanding of the limited scope of the Morton Memo.
Further still, smugglers could have intentionally misinformed
migrants about U.S. detention practices to convince them to
incur the cost of migrating—deteriorating country conditions
would more readily entice prospective migrants to embark
northward.261 Actual and perceived descriptions of the credible
fear process by politicians, news outlets, and others could also be
contributing factors.262 In short, a credible fear screening
standard that is necessarily low appears to have converged with
several factors to produce the word of mouth effect for credible
fear claims. These factors include relaxed detention standards
generally, detention policy changes for arriving aliens, credible
fear grant rates that rose after historically low levels, and groups
that facilitate the dissemination of real and perceived changes to
the credible fear process.
As to the UAC surge, perceptions about changes to law and
policy appear to more concretely account for the word of mouth
effect. As noted above, TVRPA has been cited as a reason why
UACs have migrated to the United States in greater numbers.
TVRPA did change the law in a manner that applies to UACs
currently crossing the border,263 and the repatriation rate has
declined since FY 2008.264 Reports indicate that these actual
changes, combined with a general administrative policy to defer
UAC deportations, have indeed contributed to the word of mouth

260 Preston, supra note 165 (quoting Cecilia Muñoz, director of the White House
Domestic Policy Council).
261 Some smugglers, however, depend on referrals, which may dissuade them to
intentionally provide false information.
262 See HRF, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 78, at 17.
263 See 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012).
264 See Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93.
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effect.265 In this respect, TVRPA’s causal relevance is not that
people are necessarily aware of the Act by name, but rather that
they are aware of the changes in detention and deportation
practices that can partially be attributed to TVRPA.266 Smugglers
appear to have contributed to prospective migrants’ heightened
awareness,267 but, for the reasons already discussed, the precise
extent of their role is uncertain. The impact of TVRPA on
migration levels is particularly notable because the law favors
placing UACs with friends or family.268 Researchers have noted a
strong correlation between intentions to migrate and “individuals
who have migrant friends or relatives already living abroad.”269
Most UACs have family members or family friends in the United
States with whom they plan to reside;270 many acknowledged
that family reunification was a reason why they decided to
migrate.271
Unlike TVRPA, DACA does not directly apply to UACs who
recently migrated. The DACA program, however, has been an
alleged catalyst for UACs to migrate to the United States.272
Assessing the relevance of DACA requires unpacking two distinct
issues. The first is whether DACA incentivizes UACs to travel to
the United States because these UACs believe DACA applies to
them. While not definitive, the decrease in overall apprehension
rates in the months following the creation of DACA could support
the conclusion that UACs do not believe DACA applies to
them.273 Nevertheless, there could very well have been lag time
265 See Ron Allen, Fate for Most Kids Who Cross the Border? Staying in the U.S., NBC
NEWS (July 14, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/fatemost-kids-who-cross-border-staying-u-s-n153706 (observing in immigration court that no
UACs “appear[] to be ordered out of the country any time soon”); Robles, supra note 11
(reporting that TVRPA has led to fewer deportations of minors, and immigration officials
in the Northern Triangle took note); Hulse, supra note 198 (noting that the
administration believes that TVRPA “is partly responsible for tying its hands in dealing
with the current influx of children”); see also Brian Bennett, Deportation Data Won’t
Dispel Rumors Drawing Migrant Minors to U.S., L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-deport-children-20140706-story.html#page=1.
266 But see Wong, supra note 17, at 5–6 (arguing that TVRPA has not contributed to
the surge).
267 See Peralta, supra note 208.
268 See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2).
269 Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 5.
270 See, e.g., Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93 (“Ninety percent of [UACs] are
released by ORR into the care of a parent, relative, or family friend . . . .”); Hannah
Rappleye, Undocumented and Unaccompanied: Facts, Figures on Children at the Border,
NBC NEWS (July 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/
undocumented-unaccompanied-facts-figures-children-border-n152221 (estimating that
eighty-five percent of UACs “are reunified with their immediate or extended families”).
271 UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 7–10.
272 UAC Surge Hearing, supra note 12, at 18–20 (statement of Ronald D. Vitiello,
Deputy Chief, U.S. Border Patrol).
273 See Wong, supra note 17, at 4.
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between the administration’s announcement of the program and
UACs’ (or their families’) decision to act on that information.
Additionally, UACs might believe that DACA applies to them
because numerous reports indicate that smuggling rings are
disseminating inaccurate information.274 Reviews of Central
American news coverage of DACA, however, indicate that the
coverage has accurately explained the applicability of the
program.275 Unsurprisingly then, reports have not indicated that
migrants list DACA’s applicability to them as a reason why they
chose to migrate; rather, migrants are more likely to refer to a
general belief that they can obtain a permit—or permiso—to
stay.276
More germane, perhaps, is the second reason why DACA
may be relevant: it fosters greater migration not based on its
applicability to recent UACs, but rather because of what it
represents. Specifically, DACA provides an indication that U.S.
immigration policies might provide to future categories of
unauthorized immigrants additional opportunities for reprieve
from deportation (or possibly a legal means to stay). In this
respect, DACA is part of the general immigration reform
uncertainty that could, quite understandably, further incentivize
prospective migrants to come to the United States. It is highly
unlikely that DACA itself is responsible for the surge, which is
why it is necessary to look at all the potential factors collectively.
In this respect, the prospect of future reprieve that DACA
represents must be considered against the backdrop of dire
country conditions in the Northern Triangle and U.S. laws and
policies that do actually decrease the chances of expedient
deportation.
Considering all the factors likely contributing to the surge, it
appears that as a general matter, the climate of violence,
insecurity, and depressed economic opportunities in the Northern
Triangle is the powder keg and, along with certain indications of
worsening conditions, the word of mouth effect has provided the
spark.277 The following anecdote aptly illustrates this conclusion:

274 Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 93; Dickson, supra note 207; Seville & Rappleye,
supra note 167.
275 Roque Planas, Don’t Blame Central American Newspapers for Influx of
Undocumented Children, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/06/12/central-america-daca_n_5488329.html.
276 Preston, supra note 165; see also Seville & Rappleye, supra note 167; Semple,
supra note 167.
277 Against the backdrop of all these factors are the general reasons why people want
to migrate to the United States—such as family reunification and greater opportunity—
and the established migratory networks in the Northern Triangle that facilitate
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At the church, some women said the talk about an entry permit,
which has intensified in the last two months, had prompted them to
set out on the risk-filled journey across Mexico. But the women said
they were moved mainly by desperate worries about their children,
with poverty unrelenting in their countries and warring street gangs
expanding their control. 278

Although the migrants in this illustration indicate that
deplorable country conditions were their main reason for leaving
the Northern Triangle, the powder keg/spark analogy
encapsulates the causes of the surge better than attempts to
assign specific percentages to each contributing factor.
To be sure, while the powder keg/spark analogy might
represent the general phenomenon that appears to account for
the surge, it would be overly simplistic to assume that the factors
driving all migrants during the surge are uniform. Delving into
individual cases would undoubtedly yield a range of divergent
circumstances.279 Certain migrants would have traveled to the
United States even if they did not hear about any changes in
policy. Others living in less violent regions could be opportunists
who want to take advantage of the perceived changes in policy.
Some of these opportunists could have nefarious intentions while
others simply desire to reunify with family or pursue greater
economic and educational opportunities.280 And of course, there
are others with legitimate bases for seeking refuge who never
make it to the United States because of the dangerous journey
and the nefarious actions of smuggling rings who take advantage
of migrants when they are most vulnerable. The amalgamation of
these divergent circumstances is an inevitable byproduct of the
country conditions in the Northern Triangle and U.S.
immigration policy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how Northern Triangle country
conditions, U.S. immigration policy, and smuggling organizations
collectively created the surge in credible fear claimants and
UACs. How the United States should respond to the surge is a
question beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, one
migration. Hiskey et al., supra note 139, at 5 (noting the link between migratory networks
and intentions to migrate).
278 Preston, supra note 165.
279 See UNHCR, Children on the Run, supra note 147, at 7–11 (reviewing the results
of its interviews with UACs); see also Semple, supra note 167 (recounting the multitude of
reasons UACs expressed for leaving their home countries).
280 See Asylum Surge Hearing, supra note 5, at 3, 6, 186 (attributing nefarious
intentions to some migrants, including drug cartel members who may attempt to take
advantage of the asylum process).
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potential response is worth mentioning because it should not be
contentious: substantially increasing adjudicatory capacity.
There has been a significant increase in resources provided for
enforcement efforts.281 Conversely, the number of immigration
judges tasked with adjudicating immigration cases has remained
fairly stagnant.282 The extraordinary imbalance creates a
bottleneck in the system and causes cases to languish for
significant periods of time.283 From a humanitarian perspective,
greater funding for immigration judges would decrease the
length of detention for some migrants. For those who believe that
the years migrants often spend in limbo while their cases pend is
a security risk, shorter wait times would help alleviate that
concern. Even from an economic perspective, shorter detentions
and monitoring responsibilities would offset the resources needed
to hire additional immigration judges. In short, increased
funding for immigration judges and other adjudicators should be
a no-brainer.
As noted repeatedly, the conclusions reached in this Article
are based on the available data. Unfortunately, however, the
available data is incomplete. Generally, DHS does make
publically
available
a
considerable
amount
of
immigration-related data. The agency, however, does not
consistently provide to the public the panoply of immigration
data at its disposal, nor does it always disseminate in a timely
manner the data that it does provide. Aside from disseminating
that which is at its disposal, DHS is also not taking advantage of
the extent of immigration data it could be collecting and
analyzing. The agency should significantly increase its database
capabilities and coding practices to allow enhanced research into
migratory patterns and other immigration-related issues. DHS
should also create a central location where all this data is
published rather than having it spread throughout the websites
of various agency components. Providing researchers with
accurate, robust, and easily obtainable data would help inform
policy.
The current surge and the rhetoric surrounding it are an apt
illustration of the importance of more fully understanding the
root causes of migration. Policymakers and other stakeholders
would be well-served to observe how recurrent push and pull
factors influence migratory patterns. Without a greater

281
282
283

See, e.g., U.S. BORDER PATROL, supra note 217.
See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, supra note 63.
OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., supra note 64, at A2, W1.

Do Not Delete

386

2/15/2015 7:58 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:2

understanding of the causes of migration, future legislative and
policy decisions will inevitably lead to unintended consequences.

